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TAKE THE MONEY AND SPLIT: THE CURRENT 
CIRCUIT SPLIT AND WHY ACTUAL FORCE AND 
VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION SHOULD NOT BE 
REQUIRED UNDER SECTION 2113(A) OF THE 
BANK ROBBERY ACT 
Kaitlin N. Flynn+ 
“Why do you rob banks?”1  Thief answers: “Because that’s where the money 
is.”2  As one of the FBI’s “most wanted”3 and commonly known as “Public 
Enemy Number One,”4 John Dillinger once stated, “I guess my only bad habit 
is robbing banks.  I smoke very little and don’t drink much.”5  Between the fall 
of 1933 and the summer of 1934, stories of the numerous and violent bank 
robberies John Dillinger and his gang committed filled headlines.6  The 
outbreak of the Depression Era bank robberies prompted Congress to pass the 
Bank Robbery Act of 1934,7 which specifically focused on “gangsters who 
operate habitually from one State to another in robbing banks.”8 
The Bank Robbery Act of 1934 punished “certain offenses committed 
against banks.”9  As originally enacted, however, the statute led to “some 
incongruous results” because its scope was limited to robbery and did not 
include larceny or burglary.10  Today, other inconsistencies exist, causing U.S. 
courts of appeals to disagree on whether the Bank Robbery Act requires 
																																																								
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
B.A., 2007, Johns Hopkins University. Thank you to the members of the Catholic University Law 
Review for their time, energy, and hard work given to this Comment.  I would like to thank Kerry 
and Nick for their love, patience, and encouragement.  A special thank you to my parents who 
inspire me with their tireless support and love, for which I am eternally grateful. 
 1. ELLIOT J. GORN, DILLINGER’S WILD RIDE: THE YEAR THAT MADE AMERICA’S PUBLIC 
ENEMY NUMBER ONE 129 (2009). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Famous Cases and Criminals, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/john-dillinger (last visited Nov. 3, 2012). 
 4. G. RUSSELL GIRARDIN & WILLIAM J. HELMER, DILLINGER: THE UNTOLD STORY 52 
(1994); GORN, supra note 1, at 123. 
 5. GORN, supra note 1, at 63; see GIRARDIN, supra note 4, at 109. 
 6. See Famous Cases and Criminals, supra note 3. 
 7. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, ch. 304, § 2, 48 Stat. 783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113); Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 280 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the original 1934 Bank Robbery Act was created because of “bank robberies committed by John 
Dillinger and others” (citing Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 102 (1943))). 
 8. S. REP. NO. 73-537, at 1 (1934) (quoting memorandum from the Department of Justice). 
 9. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, ch. 304, § 2. 
 10. H.R. REP. NO. 75-732, at 1–2 (1937). 
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“actual” or “attempted” force and violence or intimidation to prosecute an 
individual for attempted bank robbery.11 
The first paragraph of the Bank Robbery Act, codified at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2113(a), imposes liability upon, 
 [w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or 
attempts to take, from the person or presence of another, or obtains 
or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other 
thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, 
management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings 
and loan association.12 
The U.S. circuit courts disagree as to whether the word “attempts” applies to 
“force and violence or . . . intimidation” or whether “attempts” only applies to 
the taking of “property or money . . . belong[ing] to, or in the care of, . . . any 
bank.”  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits agree 
with the latter, holding that a conviction under § 2113(a) requires actual force 
and violence or intimidation; attempted force is not enough to sustain a 
conviction for attempted bank robbery under the statute.13  The U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits disagree, holding 
that attempted force and violence or intimidation meets § 2113(a)’s statutory 
requirements.14 
This Comment examines the split among the circuits regarding the 
application of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  Part I of this Comment examines the 
evolution of the crime of bank robbery.  Part II discusses the current split 
among the circuits on the issue of whether attempted force and violence, or 
intimidation satisfies § 2113(a) for a conviction of attempted bank robbery and 
addresses the reasons for the conflicting statutory interpretations.  Part III 
explains why § 2113(a) should be interpreted to require attempted force and 
violence or intimidation.  This analysis includes an examination of the plain 
language of the statute, Congress’s intent when enacting the statute, and the 
theory of deterrence.  These principles demonstrate the need for the statute to 
be construed so as to sustain convictions when attempted, not actual, force and 
violence or intimidation is used. 
																																																								
 11. See infra notes 13–14 and accompanying text; see also infra Part I.D. 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). 
 13. United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that “actual force 
and violence or intimidation is required for a conviction under the first paragraph of § 2113(a), 
whether the defendant succeeds (takes) or fails (attempts to take) in his robbery attempt”); United 
States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2004) (coming to the same conclusion). 
 14. See United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921 
F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984); United States 
v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
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I.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE BANK ROBBERY ACT 
A.  The History and Adoption of Larceny in American Criminal Law 
In England, the prohibition against larceny, or the wrongful taking of 
another’s property, was developed out of a need to maintain social order, to 
punish those who committed the offense, and to acknowledge the right of the 
owner to use the item.15  Larceny consists of the following elements: (1) taking 
or carrying away of property, (2) from another’s possession, and (3) with the 
intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property.16  Larceny was first 
enforced in England in the thirteenth century, but at that time, a person could 
only be convicted for taking property from another’s actual possession.17  
Larceny prohibited such takings because “violence was more likely when 
property was taken from the owner’s actual possession.”18  The law continued 
to expand, however, in recognition that the prohibition should not only reflect 
a desire to prevent social harms, but should also hold paramount the protection 
of personal property from permanent deprivation of ownership.19  As a result, 
the law began to recognize additional types of larceny offenses, including 
offenses when taking of property merely owned by another occurred or when 
taking of property occurred by trickery.20  Many American jurisdictions have 
taken these various types of theft offenses and combined them into one 
crime.21 
Robbery, a common law larceny-type offense, includes the required 
elements of larceny in addition to assault on a person.22  Force or threat of 
																																																								
 15. See Michael E. Tigar, The Right of Property and the Law of Theft, 62 TEX. L. REV. 
1443, 1448 (1984); see also George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 469, 474 (1976) (stating that the crime of larceny was viewed as a socially undesirable 
event because it disrupted social norms). 
 16. Mitchell v. United States, 394 F.2d 767, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
 17. Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 358 (1983) (noting that the primary purpose of early 
larceny laws was not to stop wrongful takings, but to prevent violence and breaches of the peace). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 359 (explaining that the history of larceny at common law was expanded to 
include cases in which the owner merely possessed, as opposed to owned, the item). 
 20. Id.; see also Arthur R. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 967 
(1953) (stating that the three types of “gentle theft” in American law are larceny, embezzlement, 
and false pretenses). 
 21. CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 633 
(2005); see also Model Penal Code § 223.1 (1980) (consolidating “conduct denominated theft” 
like “unlawful taking, deception, extortion, theft of property lost, receiving stolen property, theft 
of services and unauthorized use of automobiles” into a single offense). 
 22. United States v. W.T.T., 800 F.2d 780, 782–83 (8th Cir. 1986) (Oliver, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citing Norris v. United States, 152 F.2d 808, 809 (5th Cir. 1946)) 
(defining robbery in the federal statute as the elements of larceny plus violence or “putting in fear 
. . . at the time of the act or immediately preceding it” (emphasis omitted)). 
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force elevates a larceny to a robbery.23 The Bank Robbery Act, codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 2113, is the federal statute that applies to robberies and larcenies of 
banks.24 
B.  The Enactment of the Federal Bank Robbery Act 
Congress passed the original Bank Robbery Act in 193425 with the purpose 
of putting an end to the violence and harm caused by the outbreak of bank 
robberies during the Depression Era.26  The original Act only prosecuted 
robbery, homicide during the commission of a robbery, and aggravated assault 
that accompanied a robbery.  In an attempt to prosecute crimes of a lesser 
degree, Congress amended the statute in 1937 and again in 1948.27  The 1948 
amendments created two paragraphs within § 2113(a): the first paragraph 
restates the original Act, and the second paragraph incorporates the crime of 
larceny by prohibiting unlawful entry.28  The statute penalizes an individual for 
unlawfully taking, or attempting to take, property from the bank by force and 
violence or intimidation.29 
																																																								
 23. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 275 (2000) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting the 
added requirements of robbery—that it was an “aggravated form of larceny” whereas “larceny 
was a lesser included offense of robbery”); Danielle R. Newton, Comment, What’s Right with a  
Claim-of-Right, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 673, 676 (1999) (stating that the only difference between 
robbery and larceny is the use of force in the former). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006).  Although some jurisdictions apply common law, all federal 
crimes are statutorily based.  See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1943) 
(explaining that there are no common law criminal offenses against the United States); see also 
Patricia E. Lee, Bank Robber Act: Fraud or Larceny, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 656, 656 (1982). 
 25. Bank Robbery Act of 1934, ch. 304, § 2, 48 Stat 783 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113). 
 26. 78 CONG. REC. 8148 (1934) (statement of Sen. David Glover) (“The robbing of banks 
and killing of people for the purpose of taking away money deposited by citizens and those 
engaged in banking is a crime that should be severely punished, and this bill provides a 
punishment that will deter anyone from attempting bank robbery of this kind.”). 
 27. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 796 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2113). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006).  The statute provides, 
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the 
person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any 
property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, 
control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
association; or 
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan 
association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a 
savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in 
such savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony 
affecting such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation 
of any statute of the United States, or any larceny— 
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 
Id.	
 29. Id. 
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C.  The Attempt Doctrine 
Under § 2113(a), an individual can be prosecuted not only for actual bank 
robbery, but attempted bank robbery.30  At common law, an attempted crime 
requires (1) the specific intent to commit the crime, and (2) an “overt act” or 
“substantial step” towards the commission of the crime.31  This definition does 
not allow “mere preparation” to satisfy the requirements of attempt crimes.32  
Moreover, this definition of attempt leads to the common law standard that 
attempt crimes require specific intent.33  This common law notion has carried 
over into statutory law and into judicial interpretation of federal criminal 
statutes.34 
The heightened requirement of a culpable mental state in attempt crimes 
exists to ensure that a person involved in purely innocent conduct cannot be 
convicted of attempting to commit a crime.35  While protecting innocent 
conduct is valuable, it is also important to prevent a “substantial step” or “overt 
act” towards the commission of a crime from occurring.36 
																																																								
 30. Id. 
 31. United States v. Sarbia, 367 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Arbelaez, 
812 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1987) (listing the two elements of attempt as “(1) intent to engage in 
the criminal conduct and (2) an overt act which is a substantial step towards commission of the 
crime”). 
 32. Sarbia, 367 F.3d at 1087 (quoting State v. Lung, 28 P. 235, 236–37 (Nev. 1891)) 
(explaining that a conviction for attempt cannot be sustained if the activity is mere preparation; 
rather, there must be “direct movement” toward the commission of a crime after the preparations 
are made). 
 33. See United States v. Sneezer, 900 F.2d 177, 179 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that specific 
intent is a necessary element in attempt crimes); see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 
405 (1980) (stating that crimes, such as an attempt crime, require a “higher level” of culpability in 
order to distinguish innocent behavior from wrongful behavior); Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. 
Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 681, 748–49 (1983). 
 34. United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
Congress’s use of the word “attempt” requires that a defendant have the “specific intent to 
commit the attempted crime, even when the statute [does] not contain an explicit intent 
requirement”); United States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that attempted 
bank robbery requires specific intent and to prove attempted bank robbery, prosecutors must 
“prove that the defendant intended to take the property by force, violence or intimidation”).  But 
see United States v. Johnston, 543 F.2d 55, 57–58 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that specific intent is 
not an element of attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a)). 
 35. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d at 1193 (explaining that the purpose of a more stringent 
mental state requirement in attempt crimes is to ensure that the conduct being punished is “truly 
culpable”); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal 
Attempts: A Victim-Centered Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299, 318 (1996) (discussing how 
the criminal justice system punishes completed crimes more harshly than attempted crimes, and 
that certain preparation to commit a crime is not to be punished). 
 36. United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (1976) (providing that “[a]ttempt is a 
subtle concept that requires a rational and logically sound definition, one that enables society to 
punish malefactors who have unequivocally set out upon a criminal course without requiring law 
enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders are imperiled”); see also Robert E. 
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The Model Penal Code’s policy underlying attempt crimes focuses on the 
“desire to punish those with clear criminal intent, to deter future crimes, and to 
protect witnesses.”37 Conversely, federal attempt crimes are largely  
non-existent, and Congress has only explicitly allowed for their prosecution in 
certain federal statutes.38  Therefore, despite the wide use of attempt crimes in 
state law, many federal criminal statutes fail to provide sanctions for 
attempting to commit a crime.39  The Bank Robbery Act is one such exception. 
D.  The Discordant Analyses of Attempted Bank Robbery Under the Bank 
Robbery Act 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals disagree on whether actual force and violence 
or intimidation is necessary or whether attempted force and violence or 
intimidation suffices to sustain a conviction for attempted bank robbery under 
the first paragraph of § 2113(a).  The minority view, held by only the Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits, requires actual force and violence or intimidation to sustain a 
conviction.40  In contrast, the majority of circuits hold that a defendant’s 
attempt to use force and violence or intimidation is enough to sustain a 
conviction for attempted bank robbery.41 
1.  The Minority View: Requiring Actual Force and Violence or Intimidation 
There are two main cases that demonstrate the essence of the minority view: 
United States v. Bellew and United States v. Thornton.42 
																																																																																																																																
Wagner, A Few Good Laws: Why Federal Criminal Law Needs a General Attempt Provision and 
How Military Law Can Provide One, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1043, 1051–52 (2010); Herbert 
Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law 
Institute: Attempt, Solicitation and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 575 (1961) (explaining 
that attempt, as defined under the Model Penal Code, requires that “[t]he actor . . . have for his 
purpose to engage in the criminal conduct or accomplish the criminal result that is an element of 
the substantive crime”). 
 37. Jennifer M. Lota, Comment, Analyzing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) of the Federal Bank 
Robbery Act: Achieving Safety and Upholding Precedent Through Statutory Amendment, 7 
SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 445, 466 (2011) (citing Model Penal Code § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10 
1960)). 
 38. Wagner, supra note 36, 1052–53 (2010) (explaining that the inconsistencies in federal 
law regarding the definition of attempt have led to confusion, and in some cases, to the inability 
to convict certain wrongful actions). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bellew, 
369 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 41. See United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921 
F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984); United States 
v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
 42. Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746; Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (explaining that the attempt 
language in § 2113(a) only relates to the taking). 
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In United States v. Bellew, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
explicitly re-affirmed its position that the first paragraph of § 2113(a) requires 
actual force and violence or intimidation.43  In Bellew, the defendant went into 
a bank wearing a wig and carrying a briefcase containing a weapon and a 
demand note.44  When the defendant  requested to meet with the manager of 
the bank, the bank staff asked him to wait.45  While waiting, the defendant 
started acting strangely: he left the bank, returned, and again asked for the 
manager.46  This suspicious behavior caused the bank staff to report the 
defendant to the police.47  The court firmly held that the defendant could not be 
convicted of attempted bank robbery under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) 
because the defendant did not use actual force and violence or intimidation, 
even if he had attempted to use such force.48  In so doing, the court explicitly 
rejected the approach taken by other circuits, stating, “[w]e, therefore, reject 
the opposing interpretation given this text by our sister circuits.”49  Instead, the 
Fifth Circuit relied on many previous decisions from within the circuit to 
support its decision50 that actual force and violence or intimidation is necessary 
to sustain a conviction under § 2113(a).51  In reaching its holding, the court 
specifically noted that the “‘actual act of intimidation’ reading [is] . . . the most 
natural reading of the text.”52 
Similarly, in United States v. Thornton, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit found that actual force and violence or intimidation was 
																																																								
 43. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 453–54 (finding that the most accurate reading of 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2113(a) requires an “actual act of intimidation”); see also infra note 50. 
 44. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 451. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 451–52 (explaining that upon noticing the police, the defendant ran to his car and 
put a gun to his own head, but was taken into custody after a three-hour stand-off). 
 48. Id. at 455.  The court remanded the case for acquittal because the strange behavior and 
apparent disguise was not enough, in the court’s view, to be intimidating.  Id. 
 49. Id. at 454 (disagreeing with other circuits that hold that attempted force and violence or 
intimidation satisfies § 2113(a) by interpreting the first paragraph of § 2113(a) to require only 
actual force and violence or intimidation). 
 50. Id. (citing United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Baker, 17 F.3d 94, 96 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1357 (5th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Van, 814 F.2d 1004, 1005–06 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
 51. Id.; see Burton, 126 F.3d at 670 (enumerating “[use of] force and violence or 
intimidation” as one of the requirements for a conviction under § 2113(a)); Baker, 17 F.3d at  
95–97 (finding that the intimidation element of § 2113(a) was met when the defendant, a small, 
unarmed 11-year-old, gave the teller a note that threatened “to make [the bank] . . . red with 
blood”); McCarty, 36 F.3d at 1357 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that a reasonable jury could have 
concluded that actual intimidation existed when the defendant walked into a bank wearing 
abnormal clothing and presented a note explaining it was a bank robbery). 
 52. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (focusing on a literal reading of the first paragraph of  
§ 2113(a)). 
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required to convict an individual of attempted bank robbery.53  In Thornton, 
the defendant made extensive preparations for a bank robbery, including 
drawing sketches of the bank’s layout, and obtaining a gun as well as an old 
license plate, and a disguise.54  On the day of the robbery, the defendant 
reached the door of the bank, wearing dark clothes with a bandana covering the 
lower portion of his face.55  However, a patron noticed him, causing the 
defendant to panic and leave the scene without opening the door of the bank.56  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed whether the district court erred in 
instructing the jury that actual force and violence or intimidation was not 
required to violate the statute.57  The court, examining only the statutory 
language of § 2113(a),58 held that attempt under § 2113(a) “relates only to the 
taking and not to the intimidation.”59   Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that 
actual force and violence or intimidation is required in order to sustain a 
conviction under § 2113(a).60  Because the defendant’s actions were 
insufficient to show actual intimidation in violation of § 2113(a), the court 
reversed the conviction.61 
In reaching their holdings, both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits cited to 
United States v. Baker, a “widely-cited”62 1955 case from the U.S. District 
																																																								
 53. United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting the split in 
circuits regarding whether actual intimidation is required and following the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding in Bellew). 
 54. Id. at 743 (describing the defendant’s disguises, which included a bald cap, makeup to 
change the defendant’s complexion, a full beard, and a pillow to make him appear heavier). 
 55. Id.  When the patron first saw the defendant, they made eye contact, which scared the 
defendant.  Id.  The patron then walked up to the defendant and asked him what he was doing.  Id.  
The defendant immediately panicked, cursed the patron, and ran from the bank.  Id. 
 56. Id. (describing the defendant’s panic as he began to curse at the patron, the patron’s fear 
in response, and the patron’s subsequent denial that he saw anything suspicious). 
 57. Id. at 745 (noting that the district court’s jury instruction stated, among other things, 
“[t]o sustain the charge of attempted bank robbery . . . the government must prove . . . that the 
defendant attempted to take from the person or presence of another money belonging to and in the 
care, custody, control, management, or possession of Bank One . . . [and that] the defendant acted 
to attempt to take such money by force and violence or by intimidation” (emphasis added)). 
 58. Id. at 747 (finding that the court must adhere to the statute’s plain language because it is 
clear and unambigious). 
 59. Id. (noting that this conclusion is derived from a “straightforward reading of  
§ 2113(a)”). 
 60. Id.  The court explicitly disagreed with the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, 
which have held that attempted force and violence or intimidation is enough.  Id. (citing United 
States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 
1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Jackson, 560 
F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 61. Id. at 749–51 (holding that although the patron may have been scared of the defendant, 
there was not enough evidence to prove actual intimidation—the defendant never entered the 
bank and never demanded the money; therefore, there was no actual intimidation). 
 62. United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 540, 455 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. 
Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Cal. 1955), abrogated by Moore, 921 F.2d 207). 
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Court for the Southern District of California.63  In Baker, the defendant robbed 
the bank by writing a note to the teller of the bank, which said, “Please check 
all, into this sack. Thank you, ECB.”64  The court stated, without any citation, 
that “[i]t is apparent that in the statute . . . the word ‘attempt’ related to the 
taking and not to the intimidation.”65  Following this analysis, the court found 
the defendant guilty because there was actual intimidation in the attempted 
taking.66 
Recently, two federal district courts in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania have 
also held that actual force and violence or intimidation is required to satisfy the 
first paragraph of § 2113(a).67  The Courts of Appeals for the First and Third 
Circuits, which have jurisdiction over the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania 
district courts respectively, have never explicitly addressed whether actual or 
attempted force and violence or intimidation meets the statutory requirements 
in § 2113(a).68  Both district courts acquitted the defendant of attempted bank 
robbery because they found that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate 
the use of actual force and violence or intimidation.69 
2.  The Majority View: Attempted Force and Violence or Intimidation 
Satisfies § 2113(a) 
Unlike the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that an attempt to 
use force and violence or intimidation is sufficient to sustain a conviction 
under § 2113(a).70 
																																																								
 63. 129 F. Supp. 684; see Thornton, 539 F.3d at 746 (citing Baker, 129 F. Supp. at 686). 
 64. Baker, 129 F. Supp. at 687 (describing that when the teller questioned the defendant 
about the note’s meaning, he responded, “[r]ead it again; do as I say and there won’t be any 
trouble”). 
 65. Id. at 686 (holding that attempted bank robbery is an “attempted taking by intimidation, 
the means being intimidated”). 
 66. Id. at 687 (observing that the defendant “intended to get the money from the teller by 
intimidation . . . [and] [t]hat the teller called for help shows an awareness on her part of the 
defendant’s intention”). 
 67. United States v. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D.R.I. 2010); United States v. Smith, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2009). 
 68. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (noting that the First Circuit has not directly addressed 
whether § 2113(a) required actual force and violence or intimidation); Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77588, at *4 (“The Third Circuit has yet to have occasion to comment on this  
issue . . . .”). 
 69. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (ruling that § 2113(a) requires actual force and violence 
or intimidation and concluding that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that force and violence or intimidation existed); Smith, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77588, at *26 
(finding that no reasonable juror could find that the defendant’s actions of sitting in a parked car 
in front of a bank with masks and BB guns could meet the requirement of actual force and 
violence or intimidation). 
 70. United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Moore, 921 
F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984); 
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first federal circuit 
court to hold that attempted force and violence or intimidation met the 
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).71  In United States v. Stallworth, the 
Second Circuit was not persuaded by the defendants’ defense that they could 
not be convicted of attempted bank robbery because they did not enter the bank 
or carry any weapons.72  The defendants were apprehended before entering the 
bank because one of the co-conspirators allowed law enforcement to install a 
recording device in the car in exchange for immunity on prosecutions for four 
other bank robberies.73  The court analyzed the attempted bank robbery in a 
two-step analysis.74  First, the court determined whether the defendants had the 
specific intent to commit bank robbery.75  Second, the court considered 
whether the defendants had taken substantial steps toward the commission of 
the crime.76  Under this two-step analysis, the court upheld the conviction of 
attempted bank robbery.77 
The following year, in United States v. Jackson, the Second Circuit 
reaffirmed its holding in Stallworth and found that the defendants satisfied the 
first paragraph of § 2113(a) by attempting force and violence or intimidation 
during the commission of an attempted bank robbery.78  In Jackson, the 
defendants planned to rob a bank early on Monday morning to steal the 
weekend deposits.79  The original plan failed because the group arrived too late 
to enter with the manager; however, the defendants were persistent and 
obtained a fourth accomplice and re-planned the bank robbery for the 
following week.80  During the course of the week, one member of the group 
was arrested on a separate bank robbery charge and began to cooperate with 
																																																																																																																																
United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116–17 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Stallworth, 543 
F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 71. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040–41. 
 72. Id. at 1040 (denouncing the defendants’ argument that they had not acted in a way that 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) because they had never entered the bank or brandished any 
weapons). 
 73. Id. at 1039 (noting that the arrested individual agreed to cooperate with the FBI in order 
to avoid prosecution for four armed bank robberies that occurred between June and September 
1975). 
 74. Id. at 1040 (analyzing the elements of attempted bank robbery based on the “classic 
elements of an attempt”). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1041 (highlighting the defendants’ “substantial steps that strongly corroborate[] 
their criminal intent,” including inspecting the bank, obtaining ski masks, roofing nails, and 
weapons, and stuffing gasoline-soaked newspaper into the car to burn it after the robbery). 
 77. Id. (explaining that the only things standing between the defendants and the bank 
robbery were the law enforcement officers who stopped the crime and holding that any 
reasonable jury could find that the preparation was complete). 
 78. 560 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that the district court “anticipated the precise 
analysis which this Court adopted in the strikingly similar Stallworth case”). 
 79. Id. at 114. 
 80. Id. 
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law enforcement.81  The group, without the recently arrested  
co-conspirator, proceeded to the bank and tried to execute their plan.82 When 
they realized that they were being watched by law enforcement, the defendants 
decided not to approach the bank.83 The court, nevertheless, found them guilty 
under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) because there was evidence that they had 
the requisite intent to commit the bank robbery, and they took the required 
substantial step to fall within the scope of § 2113(a).84 
Similarly, in United States v. Wesley, the Sixth Circuit held that “[a]ctual 
intimidation is not required to prove attempted bank robbery under the first 
paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).”85  In Wesley, the defendant worked with an 
accomplice who was responsible for the getaway car, but unbeknownst to the 
defendant, his accomplice was working with the police.86  The accomplice 
allowed the police to install listening devices in the car to record the 
conversations between the accomplice and the defendant.87  The conversations 
included information about wearing nylons over their faces, carrying guns, and 
the role of the accomplice as the getaway driver.88  As part of their scheme, the 
defendant and the accomplice drove around the bank to plan the exact method 
of attack, but did not commit the robbery that day.89  The police, fearing that 
the bank robbery was imminent and that the defendant had become suspicious 
of the accomplice, arrested the defendant at his home.90  The defendant argued 
that his conviction under the first paragraph of § 2113(a) should be reversed 
because he did not use actual force and violence or intimidation—he never 
approached or tried to enter the bank.91  The court disagreed with the 
																																																								
 81. Id. at 115 (observing that the recently arrested co-conspirator told the federal agents that 
she suspected that the bank robbery would take place without her because the other conspirators 
feared that agents would be watching her). 
 82. Id. at 114–15 (discussing how the defendants realized that they were being watched by 
law enforcement officers while they were driving around the bank and describing their failed 
attempt to speed away). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 120–21 (finding that the defendants’ criminal intent was “beyond dispute” and that 
their substantial steps towards the commission of the crime were evidenced by reconnoitering at 
the bank and possessing paraphernalia to commit the crime, such as weapons and disguises). 
 85. 417 F.3d 612, 618–19 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 86. Id. at 615 (describing the cooperation between the accomplice, Deborah Reid, and the 
police). 
 87. Id. (explaining the need for three people to accompany the robber in the bank: one to 
watch the bank floor, a second to deal with the tellers, and a third to handle the vault). 
 88. Id. (outlining the defendant’s plan for the bank robbery that never actually occurred). 
 89. Id. at 616 (describing the taped discussion in the car in which the defendant and the 
accomplice noted that they could see that the vault was open from the street, but that they did not 
have the other accomplices with them to actually commit the robbery that day). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 617.   In fact, the court held that this argument was waived because it was heard 
for the first time on appeal.  Id.  However, the court still analyzed the defendant’s argument, 
“even if the issue had not been waived.”  Id. at 618. 
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defendant, noting that “actual intimidation is not required to prove attempted 
bank robbery.”92 
In a factually similar case to Wesley, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit also held that attempted force and violence or intimidation satisfied  
§ 2113(a).93  In United States v. Moore, an informant told law enforcement that 
the defendant planned to rob a bank.94  Law enforcement officers observed the 
defendant and others, including the informant, walk toward the bank wearing 
ski masks and carrying gloves, two pillowcases, and a concealed weapon.95  
On appeal, the defendant argued that there was inadequate evidence to convict 
him of attempted bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) because he was 
arrested before he even entered the bank and, thus, did not exhibit actual force, 
violence or intimidation.96  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that 
“[c]onviction under section 2113 requires only that the defendant intended to 
use force, violence or intimidation and made a substantial step toward 
consummating the robbery.”97  The court reaffirmed the conviction, holding 
that a reasonable juror could have found that the defendant committed a 
substantial step towards the commission of the bank robbery and had a 
culpable intent to rob the bank.98 
In reaching their holding, all of the majority circuits focus on the 
requirements of an attempt crime.99  These courts apply the two-tiered analysis 
																																																								
 92. Id. at 616, 618 (citing United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 
1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 93. Moore, 921 F.2d at 209. 
 94. Id. at 208. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 209 (noting the defendant’s argument that “the government cannot prove a 
necessary element of the charge”). 
 97. Id. (citing United States v. Snell, 627 F.2d 186, 187–88 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 98. Id. (explaining that the informant’s information about the planned bank robbery, 
coupled with the defendant’s walk toward the bank with a loaded weapon, ski mask, and gloves, 
demonstrated culpable intent and a substantial step).  The Fourth Circuit came to the same 
conclusion in United States v. McFadden, stating  “[i]t holds that the attempt relates to the taking 
and not the intimidation.”  739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984).  In McFadden, the defendant 
alleged that his conviction could not stand under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) because he did not use 
force, violence or intimidation, as required under the statute.  Id. at 150 (describing how the 
defendants hid disguises and weapons in the shrubbery around the bank, but they were caught 
before they could use them).  The court, using the Stallworth two-step analysis, found that there 
was sufficient evidence to convict both defendants under the Bank Robbery Act because the 
evidence showed the culpability required for the crime of attempted bank robbery and a 
substantial step towards the crime.  Id. at 152 (stating that the defendants planned the robberies, 
met and surveyed the specific location, brought weapons, and had a getaway driver and vehicle 
ready to go). 
 99. See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040–41 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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first discussed in Stallworth to find defendants that fail to enter the bank,100 or 
even approach the bank, guilty of attempted bank robbery because of their 
requisite intent and because they took a substantial step toward the commission 
of a bank robbery.101 
II.  ATTEMPTED FORCE AND VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION SHOULD  
SATISFY 18 U.S.C. § 2113(A)  
A.  The Overarching Purpose of the Statute or a Strict Reading? 
The circuit split evidences the two different approaches courts have taken 
when analyzing an attempt under the Bank Robbery Act.  The Fifth and 
Seventh Circuits narrowly read the first paragraph of § 2113(a),102 while the 
majority circuits take a much broader approach that focuses on legislative 
intent.103 
Specifically, the majority circuits analyze the overarching purpose of 
attempt crimes when criminalizing attempted use of force and violence or 
intimidation.  For example, in Jackson, the Second Circuit rejected the 
minority approach as “wooden logic,” observing that “[t]hey argue that their 
activities did not transcend a hypothetical fixed point on a spectrum of conduct 
culminating in the substantive offense of bank robbery.”104  Instead, the  
majority circuits examine attempted bank robberies under the two-tiered 
Stallworth analysis that focuses on the purpose of attempt crimes in general.105  
For example, in reaching its holding in Stallworth, the Second Circuit 
emphasized: “Attempt is a subtle concept that requires a rational and logically 
sound definition, one that enables society to punish malefactors who have 
unequivocally set out upon a criminal course without requiring law 
enforcement officers to delay until innocent bystanders are imperiled.”106  
Further, the majority circuits also emphasize that by failing to convict 
defendants for attempted force and violence or intimidation as part of an 
attempted bank robbery, inconsistencies in the purpose and rationale for 
																																																								
 100. See, e.g., McFadden, 739 F.2d at 150 (defendant arrested while walking toward the 
bank); Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040 (defendants arrested as they stepped out of their car, which 
was parked near the bank). 
 101. See, e.g., United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (defendants 
arrested days in advance of bank robbery). 
 102. See United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 453–54 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting that “18 
U.S.C. § 2113(a) specifically makes attempted bank robbery an offense” (footnote omitted)). 
 104. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040. 
 105. See supra Part I.D.2; see also United States v. Corbin, 709 F. Supp. 2d. 156, 160 (D.R.I. 
2010) (explaining that the Second Circuit’s analysis of § 2113(a) “did not examine the language 
of the statute at all, but rather appeared to read ‘force and violence or by intimidation’ right out of 
it to further the legitimate and laudable goals of crime prevention and protecting the public”). 
 106. Corbin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (quoting Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040). 
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criminalizing bank robberies will result.107  Additionally, these courts stress 
that waiting for the actual force and violence or intimidation to occur may put 
innocent employees and bystanders in a precarious position with the potential 
for injury or death.108 
On the other hand, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits disagreed with the 
majority circuits’ use of the general purpose of an attempt crime, noting, “we 
do not find these cases persuasive because they omit an appropriate statutory 
analysis.”109  Instead, these minority circuits follow a strict constructionist 
approach that focuses on the placement of the word “attempt” within the 
statute.110  Both circuits found support for their textual reading of the statue 
from the Supreme Court case, Prince v. United States.111  According to these 
circuits “[t]he attempt language only relates to the taking and not the 
intimidation.”112  When analyzing the statutory text, the Seventh Circuit noted 
that if Congress had intended for “attempt” to apply to force and violence or 
intimidation, it would have written the statute to read: “Whoever attempts by 
force and violence and intimidation to take . . . .”113  Reaching the same 
conclusion, the Fifth Circuit parsed out the elements of § 2113(a) under “the 
most natural reading of the text”: 
(1) an individual or individuals (2) used force and violence or 
intimidation (3) to take or attempt to take (4) from the person or 
																																																								
 107. Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1041 (“Application of the foregoing [two-step attempt analysis] 
to the instant case emphasizes the importance of a rule encouraging early police intervention 
where a suspect is clearly bent on the commission of crime.”). 
 108. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that waiting 
for actual force and violence or intimidation “would require that the lives of the bank employees, 
the police, any innocent bystanders and the defendants themselves be endangered before the 
arrest could be made”); Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1041 (“[Law enforcement’s] timely intervention 
probably prevented not only a robbery, but possible bloodshed in an area crowded with noontime 
shoppers.”); see also infra notes 145–48 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of 
preventing bank robberies by apprehending defendants before they actually use violence or 
intimidation). 
 109. United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 110. United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2004) (focusing on “the relevant 
text itself”); Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747 (examining the statutory text of § 2113(a) and noting that 
courts need to “simply read the text”). 
 111. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 328 (1957). 
It is a fair inference from the wording in the Act, uncontradicted by anything in the 
meager legislative history, that the unlawful entry provision was inserted to cover the 
situation where a person enters a bank for the purpose of committing a crime, but is 
frustrated for some reason before completing the crime. The gravamen of the offense is 
not in the act of entering, which satisfies the terms of the statute even if it is simply 
walking through an open, public door during normal business hours.  Rather the heart 
of the crime is the intent to steal. 
Id.	
 112. Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747. 
 113. Id.  The actual language of the first paragraph of § 2113(a) states, “Whoever, by force 
and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). 
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presence of another (5) money, property, or anything of value  
(6) belonging to or in the care, custody, control, management, or 
possession (7) of a bank, credit union, or savings and loan 
association.114 
B.  Applying the Cannons of Statutory Interpretation to § 2113(a) 
The disagreement between the minority and majority circuits depends on 
how broadly or narrowly one reads the statute.  The difference, which in reality 
boils down to one word,115 requires an in-depth analysis of the statute.  
Statutory analysis begins with the textual reading of the statute.116  If that 
language is not clear, then Congressional intent is examined.117 
1.  Construing the Statutory Text of § 2113(a) 
Statutory analysis starts with the language of the statute itself.118  The 
relevant language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) states, “[w]hoever, by force and 
violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take . . . .”119  When the 
words in the statute are plain, they are given their ordinary and normal 
meaning.120  Additionally, under the canon of noscitur a sociis, the words are 
understood by the surrounding words.121  Because the statute distinguishes 
completed taking from attempted taking,122 the statute prohibits attempts, and 
there is room for interpretation as to whether the attempts apply to both the 
taking of the money and in the force and violence or intimidation.123  The 
ambiguity in the first sentence of § 2113(a), as to whether “attempt” modifies 
the taking of the money, or if it also applies to the force and violence or 
intimidation, is resolved once Congressional intent is examined.124 
																																																								
 114. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (emphasis added). 
 115. Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (disagreeing about whether attempt relates to 
the taking, or to both the taking and the force and violence or intimidation). 
 116. Bellew, 369 F.3d at 453 (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 271 (2000)). 
 117. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 364 (2009 & Supp. 2012) (explaining that the canons of 
construction are used to examine legislative intent and to reasonably interpret the statute to meet 
the legislative purpose for its enactment). 
 118. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is elementary that the 
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms.”). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). 
 120. See Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485–86. 
 121. See EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM: READING AND CASES 168 (3d ed. 2001) (“[N]oscitur a sociis translates as ‘a 
thing is knowing by its associates.’”). 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006) (providing, “takes, or attempts to take . . .”). 
 123. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding the argument 
that attempt only relates to the taking portion of § 2113(a) unconvincing, and instead applying the 
two-tiered analysis of attempt crimes found in Stallworth). 
 124. See infra Part II.B.2 and III.A.–B. 
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2.  Congress’s Intent with the Bank Robbery Act 
After the language of the statute is considered ambiguous, the next factor to 
examine in statutory interpretation is congressional intent.125  The 1937 
amendments to the Bank Robbery Act show that Congress intended to enact a 
broad statute that would cover attempted force and violence or intimidation.126  
The Bank Robbery Act was amended in 1937 due to the concern that 
individuals successfully avoided prosecution, despite having stolen large sums 
of money, because they did not fall under the narrow language of the statute.127  
To correct this problem, the 1937 amendment broadened the statutory language 
to ensure that all wrongful conduct of attempted or completed bank robbery 
could be punishable.128  By narrowly interpreting the statute to require actual 
force and violence or intimidation in order to convict an individual of 
attempted bank robbery, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits’ holdings are contrary 
to Congress’s intent of ensuring that all criminal activity related to bank 
robberies would be punished.129 
The passage of the Bank Robbery Act reflects Congress’s attempt to 
explicitly define universally perceived wrongful conduct and to make it a 
statutory offense.130  In its enactment of the Bank Robbery Act, Congress 
																																																								
 125. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 543 U.S. 84, 93–94 (2001) (asserting that 
canons of interpretation help judges to determine congressional intent from the statutory 
language); see also 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 364 (2009 & Supp. 2012) (“The purpose of rules of 
statutory construction is to discover the true intent of the statute.”). 
 126. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-732, at 1–2 (1937) (broadening the scope of punishable behaviors 
that qualified as illegal under the Bank Robbery Act). 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. (“The Attorney General has recommended the enactment of this proposed legislation 
which is designed to enlarge the scope of the bank robbery statute . . . to include larceny and 
burglary of the banks protected by this statute.”). 
 129. Interestingly, in reaching their conclusions, both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits 
explicitly note that the defendants could have been charged under the second paragraph of  
§ 2113(a), which criminalizes actual or attempted larceny during a bank robbery.  See supra note 
28 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“Thornton could have been prosecuted under the second paragraph of § 2113(a) so the 
government is not without a law under which to seek conviction of defendants under similar 
factual circumstances” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 452–53 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (“Bellew was not indicted under the second paragraph of Section 2113(a), though it 
appears that the facts would have supported such a charge.”).  However, this recourse is not 
beneficial for two important reasons.  First, a conviction under the second paragraph of  
§ 2113(a) carries a lighter sentence and cannot be a predicate for a firearm charge.  See Thornton, 
539 F.3d at 747.  Second, an individual who is caught after taking a substantial step, but before he 
has actually attempted to enter a bank, will not fit within the second paragraph’s purview.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that, unlike the 
factual scenario with which the Fifth Circuit was faced, the defendant in Wesley could not be 
convicted under the second paragraph because the police apprehended the defendant before he 
actually attempted to enter a bank). 
 130. See United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1991). 
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intended to codify a malum in se, or inherently evil, activity.131  However, 
courts, by prohibiting the conviction of an individual who only uses attempted 
force and violence or intimidation, dilute this statutory prohibition.132  Because 
the conduct is inherently wrong and signifies an attempt to rob a bank, the 
statute should apply whether the perpetrator attempts or successfully uses force 
and violence or intimidation.133  Once the defendant demonstrates a substantial 
step towards committing bank robbery, the defendant should be punished for 
the natural and probable consequences of the action.134  The interpretation 
given by the majority of the circuits follows Congress’s intent when passing 
the Bank Robbery Act, and the narrow reading of the minority circuits fails to 
unite the statutory language with its congressional purpose. 
III.  UNDERSTANDING THE IMPORTANCE OF CRIMINALIZING ATTEMPTED 
FORCE AND VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION 
A.  The Purpose of Criminal Law Is Served when Attempted Force and 
Violence or Intimidation Satisfies § 2113(a) 
One of the main theories of punishment in American criminal law is 
deterrence.135  Deterrence is a utilitarian principle centered on the basis that 
punishment can be beneficial by dissuading individuals from committing  
 
 
																																																								
 131. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-732, at 1–2 (1937) (describing the act of armed bank robbery as 
“inherently and essentially evil”). 
 132. See Thornton, 539 F.3d at 747 (acknowledging the circuit split and deciding that the 
plain language of § 2113(a) requires actual force and violence or intimidation to sustain a 
conviction).  Compare Bellew, 369 F.3d at 454 (requiring actual force and violence or 
intimidation), with United States v. Baker, 129 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (stating that 
“attempt” in the statute only relates to the taking and not to the intimidation), abrogated by 
United States v. Moore, 921 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 133. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151–52 (4th Cir. 1984) (explaining that 
actions such as discussing plans for the robbery, reconnoitering at the bank, and gathering the 
disguises and weapons may be grounds for a conviction of attempted bank robbery); United 
States v. Jackson, 560 F.2d 112, 116–17 (2d Cir. 1977) (concluding that the holding in United 
States v. Stallworth precludes the defendant from successfully arguing that § 2113(a) requires 
actual force and violence or intimidation); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1041 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (recognizing other courts that have convicted individuals for attempted bank robbery, 
even when the robbers had not committed assault and had not entered the bank, and voicing the 
importance of the “rational policies underlying the attempt doctrine”). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 837 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 135. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of 
Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2003); see also, 
MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 104–05, 151 
(1997) (explaining retributivism, another principle of criminal law, which is focused on punishing 
the criminal because he deserves punishment). 
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crimes.136  There are two types of deterrence: general and specific.137  The 
purpose of general deterrence is to prevent individuals from acting in a 
wrongful way by making society aware of the punishment for wrongful 
conduct.138  The purpose of specific deterrence is to punish the wrongdoer, so 
he or she suffers, and, as a result, will not repeat the criminal act.139  If the 
person repeats the act, he or she will be punished again—and usually, more 
severely.140 Section 2113(a) accomplishes both goals of general and specific 
deterrence when attempted bank robberies satisfy the requirements of the 
statute.  It sends a clear message that bank robbery, through attempted or actual 
violence or intimidation, is criminal and will be punished.  This strong stance 
will help deter future attempted bank robberies.  In addition, the purpose of 
punishing the wrongful conduct is satisfied. 
Criminal liability should be determined by what the bank robber tried to 
accomplish, and not by the success of his actions.141  If an individual tries to 
rob a bank, with the intent to use actual force and violence or intimidation, but 
fails, his or her criminal liability should not be negated.142  Reading the statute 
in a way that precludes convicting such activity does not serve the principle of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								
 136. See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 482 
(1999) (“Deterrence theory is utilitarian . . . in nature.”); see also Hon. Robert T. Altman, Letter 
to the Editor, Hate Crime Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1998, at B6 (“We punish wrongdoers 
in order to protect innocent people and to deter potential criminals.”). 
 137. See Wendy Imatani Peloso, Note, Les Miserables: Chain Gangs and the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1492 (1997) (explaining the difference 
between general and specific deterrence, and noting that general deterrence focuses on preventing 
anyone from committing the crime and specific deterrence seeks to prevent ex-offenders from  
re-committing crimes). 
 138. See Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 
159–61 (2003). 
 139. See Kahan, supra note 136, at 415 (1999) (referring to “deterrence” as “a policy aimed 
at creating efficient behavioral incentives”); Robinson & Darley, supra note 135, at 954 (“[A]ny 
system that can impose punishment can produce a credible deterrent ‘bite.’”). 
 140. See Kahan, supra note 136, at 425 (describing how the “deterrence theory focuses on 
consequences” and, as such, will punish recidivists). 
 141. See Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the 
Code and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 727 (1988) (explaining that the rationale 
for protection and allowing law enforcement to stop the crime before it is complete). 
 142. See United States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976) (distinguishing mere 
preparation from attempt by noting that “the requirement that the objective acts of the defendant 
evidence commitment to the criminal venture and corroborate the mens rea”); United States v. 
Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19–20 (8th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the Federal Bank Robbery Act is 
comprehensive and intended to cover “aggressions” that occur in a bank robbery). 
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deterrence.143  Instead, it may encourage the same bank robber to try again.144 
Further, one fundamental purpose of criminal law is to allow the community 
to condemn inappropriate actions.145  As early as 1784, English courts 
recognized the attempt doctrine.146 The primary reason that the criminal justice 
system criminalizes attempted criminal activity is to prevent the contemplated 
act from occurring.147  Punishing an attempted bank robbery is important, in 
particular, because innocent bank employees and bystanders could be injured 
easily, even with an unsuccessful robbery.148  The purpose of the attempt 
doctrine is to avoid this type of scenario.149  As such, an individual’s attempt to 
use force and violence or intimidation should be criminalized and should 
satisfy the first paragraph of § 2113(a).150  Requiring law enforcement to wait 
until the force and violence or intimidation was complete in order to ensure 
that the defendant can be convicted under the first paragraph of  
																																																								
 143. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2005) (stating implicitly that deterrence requires guilt of the 
defendant in order for deterrence to have its appropriate effect; if the defendant knows and 
understands the wrongful conduct, the punishment will dissuade similar behavior from occurring 
again). 
 144. See United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that one 
benefit of the attempt doctrine is to ensure that public safety and welfare are not disturbed).  This 
problem was most poignantly exemplified in United States v. Bellew, 369 F.3d 450, 451–53 (5th 
Cir. 2004).  In Bellew, the defendant returned to the bank numerous times to try to speak with the 
bank manager in an attempt to rob the bank.  Id. at 451.  Nonetheless, the court held that the 
defendant could not be charged with attempted bank robbery because he did not actually 
intimidate anyone.  Id. at 453. 
 145. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (highlighting the importance of 
legislatures defining criminal activity because the punishment represents the community’s moral 
condemnation of wrongful conduct); Kahan, supra note 136, at 421. 
 146. Rex v. Scofield, Cald. Mag. Rep. 397, 402–03 (1784); see also  Francis Bones Sayre, 
Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 833–36 (1928) (reviewing the English development of 
attempt). 
 147. See Ashworth, supra note 141, at 727 (noting the importance of prevention in 
minimizing the injury). 
 148. See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 151 (4th Cir. 1984) (discussing the 
danger of waiting to arrest the defendant until he or she has used actual force and violence or 
intimidation); Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1041 (noting the potential danger to bank patrons). 
 149. Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt – A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 YALE 
L.J. 789, 817 (1940) (explaining that the function of the attempt doctrine is to prevent criminal 
activity from occurring by putting a halt to it in the early stages before the crime is in fact 
committed). 
 150. See United States v. Roundtree, 527 F.2d 16, 19–20 (8th Cir. 1975) (“18 U.S.C. § 2113, 
is a comprehensive statute containing special provisions for increased punishment for aggravated 
offenses. It is intended to cover most of the aggressions that may arise from a bank  
robbery . . . .”); contra Michael Rizzo, Casenote & Comment, The Need to Apply the “Plain 
Meaning” Rule to the First Paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is “Plain”: A Bank Robber Must 
Have Used Actual Force and Violence or Intimidation, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 228–29 
(2009) (arguing that an attempt should not be punished under § 2113(a) based on the language of 
the statute). 
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§ 2113(a) would contradict the purpose of attempt crimes and the role of law 
enforcement to protect society.151 
B.  Criminalizing Attempted Force and Violence or Intimidation Accomplishes 
Congress’s Purpose for Enacting § 2113 
Additionally, holding that attempted force and violence or intimidation 
satisfies § 2113(a) matches the public policy goals of § 2113(a).152  The 
congressional record clearly indicates that the purpose for enacting the Bank 
Robbery Act was to prevent attempted and completed bank robberies.153 The 
crime of attempted bank robbery requires that the defendant be convicted only 
if there was sufficient evidence that he or she had the intent to rob the bank.154  
For a successful bank robbery, it is immaterial for the law’s purpose to deter 
this type of crime, regardless of whether there was actual or attempted force 
and violence or intimidation, but for an attempted, but unsuccessful bank 
robbery, the statutory interpretation is critical.155  A conviction should be 
upheld if the defendant is prohibited from completing the bank robbery while 
attempting to use force and violence or intimidation.  By only criminalizing 
those defendants who use actual force and violence or intimidation during an 
attempted bank robbery, courts are severely limiting the number of defendants 
who can be convicted.  Such a stringent reading provides no recourse to 
convict an individual who was caught before he ever walked inside the bank.156 
C.  Judicial Conformity Is Necessary to Ensure Consistent Prosecution 
In order to create consistent federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court should 
grant certiorari to address the issue of whether actual or attempted force and 
violence or intimidation is required under the Bank Robbery Act.157  
																																																								
 151. See Stallworth, 543 F.2d at 1040 (noting that the purpose of the attempt doctrine is to 
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Inconsistent applications of a federal statute can lead to a lack of predictability 
and unequal application of the law, and undermine the legitimacy of the statute 
itself.158  The need for uniformity in federal laws is highlighted through the 
contradictory outcomes in the cases addressing § 2113(a).159  An explicit ruling 
on this issue would eliminate an area of long-standing disagreement among the 
circuits and ensure that all defendants will be prosecuted uniformly, regardless 
of which jurisdiction they attempt to commit their crime. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Currently, the circuit courts disagree on whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) 
requires actual or attempted force and violence or intimidation. This unsettled 
statutory interpretation and riff between the circuits has developed over the 
course of more than half a century.  However, as of yet, courts have not come 
to a meaningful resolution.  Nonetheless, a careful evaluation of Congress’s 
intent when it enacted the Bank Robbery Act, coupled with an analysis of the 
attempt doctrine, demonstrates the need to prosecute an individual for 
attempted bank robbery when he attempted to, but did not actually, use force 
and violence or intimidation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																
cases raising issues over which the lower courts disagree.”).  The importance of consistent 
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